fix: use curl for addKey — PIA's CA cert fails modern OpenSSL by default
Found live, 2026-09-22, on the addKey step of the first successful kill-switch-check pass: every candidate failed with kind=tls detail="certificate verification failed". Root-caused on minisforum: PIA's own CA certificate (files/pia-ca.crt) has a CA:TRUE Basic Constraints extension that isn't marked critical - a real RFC 5280 non-conformance, confirmed not a stale vendored copy (a fresh fetch from pia-foss/manual-connections is byte-identical, same sha256 already recorded in the file's own header, same defect). Recent OpenSSL (3.2+; confirmed via a direct repro against minisforum's 3.5.7 - SSLCertVerificationError, verify_message "Basic Constraints of CA cert not marked critical") rejects this by default, a check promoted from X509_STRICT-only into the baseline chain-verification path. openssl s_client (LibreSSL, this dev machine) and curl both accept the identical cert/chain/CA file - only Python's ssl module, via this host's system OpenSSL, rejects it. This went unnoticed until now because the three prior successful registrations all went through curl --cacert (the legacy Ansible path); this was the first time the Python ssl code path ran for real. Python's stdlib ssl module has no custom verify-callback hook, so there's no clean way to tolerate just this one known, third-party-controlled defect while keeping full validation for everything else. Rather than weakening verify_mode or adding a new dependency (pyOpenSSL, for a real callback - considered, rejected as a bigger lift than necessary) to route around a gap in a library we don't control, addKey now shells out to curl (HttpClient.get_pinned_curl, curl added to this role's apt list) - the same tool PIA's own reference client already uses for this exact endpoint, with --cacert and never -k/--insecure, so this is a different, already-proven-correct TLS backend for the one endpoint that needs it, not a downgrade. serverlist/token are unaffected (public WebPKI certs) and still use the stdlib ssl path. Verified: a real subprocess curl call against the actual failing candidate (Server-11669-10a / 69.33.198.97) gets a genuine HTTP response from PIA, proving TLS validation succeeds via this path. Also found and handled: curl's own exit code for a --fail-triggered rejection isn't fully portable (macOS/SecureTransport curl reports 56 where GNU/OpenSSL curl reports 22 for the same case) - classification now also matches curl's own error text as a second signal, not just the exit code. Added 8 tests (94 total, all passing) covering the curl invocation shape, stdin token delivery (no trailing newline, never in argv), and exit-code + text-based error classification including the cross-platform exit-code case found live. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
parent
7b78e4a88e
commit
99f6ef84f0
@ -268,10 +268,14 @@ handled automatically — see the next section.
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## Automatic recovery
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`files/pia_gateway.py` is installed as `/usr/local/sbin/pia-gateway`
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(root, `0700`, standard library only — runs on the host's `python3.13`).
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It is **one** implementation of PIA registration shared by the unattended
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timers and by this role's own registration step, so the two can never
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drift. Layout on the host:
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(root, `0700`, runs on the host's `python3.13`). Almost entirely standard
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library — the one exception is `addKey` specifically, which shells out to
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`curl` (now an explicit `apt` dependency of this role); see
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`HttpClient.get_pinned_curl`'s own docstring and "PIA's CA certificate and
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why addKey uses curl, not Python's `ssl`" below for why. It is **one**
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implementation of PIA registration shared by the unattended timers and by
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this role's own registration step, so the two can never drift. Layout on
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the host:
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| Path | Purpose |
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| --- | --- |
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@ -285,6 +289,64 @@ drift. Layout on the host:
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| `pia-gateway-onfailure.service` | `OnFailure=` of the two above: posts an error alert if a unit crashes or refuses to run |
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| `pia-gateway-healthcheck.timer` | unchanged cadence, now runs `pia-gateway check` |
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### PIA's CA certificate and why addKey uses curl, not Python's `ssl`
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Found live, 2026-09-22, on the very first `pia-gateway register` attempt
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after the FORWARD-jump fix above got past the kill-switch check:
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`addKey` failed against every candidate with `kind=tls detail=certificate
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verification failed`. Root-caused directly on minisforum:
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```
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$ sudo python3 -c '...ctx.wrap_socket(sock, server_hostname="Server-11669-10a")...'
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SSLCertVerificationError verify_message= Basic Constraints of CA cert not marked critical
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```
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PIA's own CA certificate (`files/pia-ca.crt`) has a `CA:TRUE` Basic
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Constraints extension that isn't flagged `critical` — a real RFC 5280
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non-conformance, confirmed **not** a stale vendored copy: a fresh fetch
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from `pia-foss/manual-connections` on GitHub is byte-identical (same
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`32e9b1d1...` SHA-256 already recorded in the file's own header) and has
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the identical defect. This is PIA's problem, not ours, and not fixable by
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re-vendoring. Recent OpenSSL (3.2+; confirmed live against minisforum's
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`3.5.7`) rejects this by default — a check that used to be opt-in only
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under `X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT` and has since been promoted into the
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default chain-verification path. `openssl s_client` on this repo's own
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dev machine (LibreSSL) and this same host's `curl` both accept the exact
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same certificate/chain/CA file without complaint — only Python's `ssl`
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module, using this host's system OpenSSL, rejects it. That's also why
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this went unnoticed until the auto-recovery work: the legacy Ansible
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path's three successful registrations (2026-08-24, 08-25, and this
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morning) all went through `curl --cacert` (`addkey-attempt.yaml`), never
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through Python's `ssl` module — this was the *first* time that code path
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ever ran for real.
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Python's stdlib `ssl` module has no custom-verify-callback hook (a
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long-standing, deliberate upstream gap — unlike Go's
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`tls.Config.VerifyPeerCertificate` or OpenSSL's own C API), so there is
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no clean way to tolerate just this one known, third-party-controlled
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defect while still fully validating everything else (chain, expiry,
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hostname/SAN). Rather than weakening `verify_mode` for the whole
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connection or adding a new dependency (`pyOpenSSL`, for a real verify
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callback — considered, rejected as a bigger lift than necessary) to work
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around a gap in a library we don't control, `addKey` specifically now
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shells out to `curl` (`HttpClient.get_pinned_curl`, `curl` added to this
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role's `apt` install list) — the same tool PIA's own reference client
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(`connect_to_wireguard_with_token.sh`) already uses for this exact
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endpoint, with `--cacert` and never `-k`/`--insecure`, so this is a
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different, already-proven-correct TLS backend for the one endpoint that
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needs it, not a security downgrade. `serverlist` and the token endpoint
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are unaffected (they present public WebPKI certs, which don't have this
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problem) and still use the stdlib `ssl` path. Verified: a real subprocess
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`curl` call from this repo's dev machine against the actual failing
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candidate (`Server-11669-10a` / `69.33.198.97`) gets a genuine HTTP
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response from PIA (401, expected — a dummy token was used), proving TLS
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validation succeeds via this path where it failed via Python's `ssl`.
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curl's own exit codes for a `--fail`-triggered rejection aren't fully
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portable either — confirmed live: a curl built against SecureTransport
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(this dev machine) reports exit 56, not the "usual" 22 GNU/OpenSSL curl
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uses for the identical case — so classification checks curl's own error
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text as a second signal alongside the exit code, not the exit code alone.
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### Status classes
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Every pass classifies the gateway into exactly one of: `healthy`,
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@ -468,16 +530,23 @@ external secret broker — not a 24-hour token.
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### Rollout status (2026-09-22)
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Step 1 (baseline) and the first attempt at step 2 have been run live.
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Step 2 failed on the first try: `pia-gateway register` correctly refused
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with `safety invariants failing ... FORWARD jump to kill-switch chain is
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Step 1 (baseline) and two attempts at step 2 have been run live.
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- **Attempt 1** failed: `pia-gateway register` correctly refused with
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`safety invariants failing ... FORWARD jump to kill-switch chain is
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not first` — a real, pre-existing drift (see the "FORWARD jump's
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position is actively re-asserted" note above), not a false alarm from
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this session's work, and not the "session dies" handshake issue either.
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Root-caused and fixed in `pia-killswitch.sh.j2`; not yet re-applied or
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re-verified live. **Use `iptables -S FORWARD` (no `head`) for the
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baseline capture below** — the original `head -3` suggestion is what
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hid this the first time; the drift was 4 rules in, not at the top.
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this session's work, and not the "session dies" handshake issue
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either. Root-caused and fixed in `pia-killswitch.sh.j2`.
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- **Attempt 2**, after that fix, got past the kill-switch check and
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failed differently: `addKey` rejected every candidate with
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`kind=tls detail=certificate verification failed`. Root-caused and
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fixed — see "PIA's CA certificate and why addKey uses curl, not
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Python's `ssl`" above. Not yet re-applied or re-verified live.
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**Use `iptables -S FORWARD` (no `head`) for the baseline capture below**
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— the original `head -3` suggestion is what hid the first issue; the
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drift was 4 rules in, not at the top.
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1. Baseline on minisforum: `wg show pia-wg`, `ip rule`, `ip route show
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table pia`, `iptables -S FORWARD`, `iptables -S PIA-VLAN50`,
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@ -751,33 +751,14 @@ class Classifier:
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# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
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class _PinnedHTTPSConnection(http.client.HTTPSConnection):
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"""Connect to a fixed IP while verifying TLS against the hostname (SNI)."""
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def __init__(self, host: str, ip: str, port: int, context: ssl.SSLContext, connect_timeout: float, total_timeout: float):
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super().__init__(host, port, timeout=connect_timeout, context=context)
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self._pinned_ip = ip
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self._total_timeout = total_timeout
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def connect(self) -> None: # noqa: D401
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sock = socket.create_connection((self._pinned_ip, self.port), self.timeout)
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sock.settimeout(self._total_timeout)
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self.sock = self._context.wrap_socket(sock, server_hostname=self.host)
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class HttpClient:
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def __init__(self, cfg: Config):
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def __init__(self, cfg: Config, system: Optional[System] = None):
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self.cfg = cfg
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self.system = system or System()
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def _system_ctx(self) -> ssl.SSLContext:
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return ssl.create_default_context()
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def _pia_ctx(self) -> ssl.SSLContext:
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ctx = ssl.create_default_context(cafile=self.cfg.ca_file)
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ctx.check_hostname = True
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ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_REQUIRED
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return ctx
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def _request(self, conn: http.client.HTTPSConnection, method: str, path: str, body: Optional[bytes], headers: dict) -> tuple[int, bytes]:
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try:
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conn.request(method, path, body=body, headers=headers)
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@ -825,12 +806,68 @@ class HttpClient:
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}
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return self._request(conn, "POST", u.path, body, headers)
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def get_pinned(self, hostname: str, ip: str, port: int, path: str, query: dict[str, str]) -> tuple[int, bytes]:
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conn = _PinnedHTTPSConnection(
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hostname, ip, port, self._pia_ctx(), self.cfg.http_connect_timeout_sec, self.cfg.http_total_timeout_sec
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)
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full = path + "?" + urllib.parse.urlencode(query)
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return self._request(conn, "GET", full, None, {"User-Agent": "pia-gateway"})
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def get_pinned_curl(self, hostname: str, ip: str, port: int, path: str, token: str, pubkey: str) -> tuple[int, bytes]:
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"""Pinned-IP, SNI-validated, CA-pinned GET — for PIA's addKey only.
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This shells out to curl instead of using the stdlib `ssl` module.
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Confirmed live (2026-09-22): PIA's own CA certificate (byte-
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identical to a fresh fetch from PIA's own repo — not a stale
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vendored copy) has a non-critical Basic Constraints extension on
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its CA cert, a real RFC 5280 non-conformance in a CA we don't
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control. Recent OpenSSL (3.2+; confirmed on minisforum's 3.5.7 via
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a direct repro — SSLCertVerificationError, verify_message
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"Basic Constraints of CA cert not marked critical") rejects that
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in its default chain verification, a check promoted from
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X509_STRICT-only to the default path in recent OpenSSL releases.
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Python's stdlib `ssl` module has no custom verify-callback hook to
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selectively tolerate just this one known, third-party-controlled
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defect while still fully validating everything else (chain,
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expiry, hostname/SAN) — that gap is long-standing and
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deliberate upstream, not something to route around by weakening
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verify_mode. curl's TLS stack on this host does not enforce this
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specific check and is what PIA's own reference implementation
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(connect_to_wireguard_with_token.sh) already uses for this exact
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endpoint — reusing it here with --cacert (never -k/--insecure) is
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not a security downgrade, just a different, already-proven-correct
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TLS backend for the one endpoint that needs it. serverlist and
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token still use the stdlib ssl path above against public WebPKI
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certs, which do not have this problem.
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"""
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argv = [
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"curl", "--silent", "--show-error", "--fail", "--location", "-G",
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"--connect-timeout", str(self.cfg.http_connect_timeout_sec),
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"--max-time", str(self.cfg.http_total_timeout_sec),
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"--cacert", self.cfg.ca_file,
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"--connect-to", f"{hostname}::{ip}:",
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"--data-urlencode", "pt@-",
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"--data-urlencode", f"pubkey={pubkey}",
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f"https://{hostname}:{port}{path}",
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]
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r = self.system.run(argv, stdin=token, timeout=self.cfg.http_total_timeout_sec + 10)
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if r.rc == 0:
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return 200, r.out.encode("utf-8")
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err = (r.err or "").strip()
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# Exit codes are the primary signal, but not fully portable across
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# curl builds/TLS backends — confirmed live: a curl built against
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# SecureTransport reported exit 56 (CURLE_RECV_ERROR) for the exact
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# same --fail-triggered HTTP rejection GNU/OpenSSL curl reports as
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# 22. curl's own error text ("returned error: NNN" for --fail,
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# "timed out" for CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT, TLS-related wording for
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# cert/handshake problems) is a second, more portable signal — used
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# here as a fallback classifier alongside the exit code, not a
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# replacement for it.
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if r.rc == 127:
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raise ApiError("network", "curl not found on PATH")
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if r.rc == 28 or "timed out" in err.lower():
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raise ApiError("timeout", f"curl: connection or transfer timed out: {err}")
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if r.rc in (35, 53, 54, 58, 59, 60, 66, 77, 80, 82, 83) or "ssl" in err.lower() or "certificate" in err.lower():
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raise ApiError("tls", f"curl TLS error (exit {r.rc}): {err}")
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if r.rc == 22 or "returned error:" in err:
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# --fail suppresses the body on a non-2xx response, so there is
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# no status code or body to parse here — same limitation the
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# legacy curl-based Ansible path already had.
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raise ApiError("http", f"curl: non-2xx HTTP response (exit {r.rc}): {err}")
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raise ApiError("network", f"curl exit {r.rc}: {err}")
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@dataclasses.dataclass
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@ -942,7 +979,7 @@ class PiaApi:
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raise ApiError("http", f"token HTTP {last_status}")
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def add_key(self, cand: Candidate, token: str, pubkey: str) -> PeerInfo:
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status, data = self.http.get_pinned(cand.cn, cand.ip, ADDKEY_PORT, "/addKey", {"pt": token, "pubkey": pubkey})
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status, data = self.http.get_pinned_curl(cand.cn, cand.ip, ADDKEY_PORT, "/addKey", token, pubkey)
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if status != 200:
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raise ApiError("http", f"addKey HTTP {status}")
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if not data.strip():
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@ -1133,7 +1170,7 @@ class Controller:
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self.cfg = cfg
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self.sys = system
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self.log = log
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self.http = http or HttpClient(cfg)
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self.http = http or HttpClient(cfg, system)
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self._creds = creds
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self.store = StateStore(cfg, system)
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self.classifier = Classifier(cfg, system)
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@ -27,10 +27,16 @@
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- wireguard-tools
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- iproute2
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- python3
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- curl
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state: present
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update_cache: true
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# python3-requests is no longer needed: the controller uses only the
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# standard library.
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# standard library, EXCEPT for the addKey endpoint specifically, which
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# shells out to curl — see HttpClient.get_pinned_curl's own docstring
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# for why (a non-critical Basic Constraints extension on PIA's own CA
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# cert that recent OpenSSL rejects by default and Python's ssl module
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# has no way to selectively tolerate). curl is virtually always already
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# present on Debian, but declared explicitly rather than assumed.
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- name: Pin reverse-path filtering for {{ pia_wg_interface }}
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ansible.posix.sysctl:
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@ -255,8 +255,8 @@ class FakeHttp:
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return 200, val
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return 200, json.dumps({"token": val}).encode()
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def get_pinned(self, hostname, ip, port, path, query):
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self.calls.append(("addkey", hostname, ip, port, path, dict(query)))
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def get_pinned_curl(self, hostname, ip, port, path, token, pubkey):
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self.calls.append(("addkey", hostname, ip, port, path, {"pt": token, "pubkey": pubkey}))
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kind, val = self.addkey.get(hostname, ("http", 502))
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if kind == "err":
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raise pg.ApiError(val, "fake")
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@ -1227,6 +1227,106 @@ def dataclass_dict(cfg):
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return dataclasses.asdict(cfg)
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class FakeCurlSystem(pg.System):
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"""Fakes just enough of System.run to exercise get_pinned_curl's argv
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construction, stdin handling, and exit-code classification, without a
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real curl binary or network access."""
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def __init__(self, result=None):
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self.result = result or pg.CmdResult(0, '{"status":"OK"}', "")
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self.calls = []
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self.stdins = []
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def run(self, argv, stdin=None, timeout=60):
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self.calls.append(list(argv))
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if stdin is not None:
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self.stdins.append(stdin)
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return self.result
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class TestPinnedCurlAddKey(unittest.TestCase):
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def setUp(self):
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self.cfg = pg.Config(ca_file="/etc/wireguard/pia-ca.crt", http_connect_timeout_sec=10, http_total_timeout_sec=30)
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def test_argv_shape_matches_the_proven_legacy_curl_invocation(self):
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sysm = FakeCurlSystem()
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http_client = pg.HttpClient(self.cfg, sysm)
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status, data = http_client.get_pinned_curl("Server-11669-10a", "69.33.198.97", 1337, "/addKey", SECRET_TOKEN, PUB_A)
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self.assertEqual(status, 200)
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self.assertEqual(data, b'{"status":"OK"}')
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argv = sysm.calls[0]
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self.assertEqual(argv[0], "curl")
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self.assertIn("--fail", argv)
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self.assertIn("-G", argv)
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self.assertIn("--cacert", argv)
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self.assertEqual(argv[argv.index("--cacert") + 1], "/etc/wireguard/pia-ca.crt")
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self.assertIn("--connect-to", argv)
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self.assertEqual(argv[argv.index("--connect-to") + 1], "Server-11669-10a::69.33.198.97:")
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self.assertIn("pt@-", argv)
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self.assertIn(f"pubkey={PUB_A}", argv)
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self.assertEqual(argv[-1], "https://Server-11669-10a:1337/addKey")
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# never -k/--insecure — this must still be a real, validating request
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self.assertNotIn("-k", argv)
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self.assertNotIn("--insecure", argv)
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def test_token_passed_via_stdin_with_no_trailing_newline_and_never_in_argv(self):
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sysm = FakeCurlSystem()
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http_client = pg.HttpClient(self.cfg, sysm)
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http_client.get_pinned_curl("Server-11669-10a", "69.33.198.97", 1337, "/addKey", SECRET_TOKEN, PUB_A)
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self.assertEqual(sysm.stdins, [SECRET_TOKEN]) # exact match: no appended "\n"
|
||||
for arg in sysm.calls[0]:
|
||||
self.assertNotIn(SECRET_TOKEN, arg)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_timeout_exit_code_classified(self):
|
||||
sysm = FakeCurlSystem(pg.CmdResult(28, "", "curl: (28) Connection timed out"))
|
||||
http_client = pg.HttpClient(self.cfg, sysm)
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(pg.ApiError) as cm:
|
||||
http_client.get_pinned_curl("h", "1.2.3.4", 1337, "/addKey", "t", "p")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(cm.exception.kind, "timeout")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_tls_exit_codes_classified_with_stderr_detail(self):
|
||||
for rc in (35, 53, 54, 58, 59, 60, 66, 77, 80, 82, 83):
|
||||
with self.subTest(rc=rc):
|
||||
sysm = FakeCurlSystem(pg.CmdResult(rc, "", "curl: (60) SSL certificate problem"))
|
||||
http_client = pg.HttpClient(self.cfg, sysm)
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(pg.ApiError) as cm:
|
||||
http_client.get_pinned_curl("h", "1.2.3.4", 1337, "/addKey", "t", "p")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(cm.exception.kind, "tls")
|
||||
self.assertIn("SSL certificate problem", cm.exception.detail)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_http_failure_exit_code_classified(self):
|
||||
sysm = FakeCurlSystem(pg.CmdResult(22, "", "curl: (22) The requested URL returned error: 401"))
|
||||
http_client = pg.HttpClient(self.cfg, sysm)
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(pg.ApiError) as cm:
|
||||
http_client.get_pinned_curl("h", "1.2.3.4", 1337, "/addKey", "t", "p")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(cm.exception.kind, "http")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_nonstandard_exit_code_with_fail_text_still_classified_as_http(self):
|
||||
# Observed live: curl built against SecureTransport reports exit 56
|
||||
# (CURLE_RECV_ERROR), not the "usual" 22, for the same --fail
|
||||
# -triggered HTTP rejection — the error text is the portable signal.
|
||||
sysm = FakeCurlSystem(pg.CmdResult(56, "", "curl: (56) The requested URL returned error: 401"))
|
||||
http_client = pg.HttpClient(self.cfg, sysm)
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(pg.ApiError) as cm:
|
||||
http_client.get_pinned_curl("h", "1.2.3.4", 1337, "/addKey", "t", "p")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(cm.exception.kind, "http")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_curl_missing_classified_as_network_not_a_crash(self):
|
||||
sysm = FakeCurlSystem(pg.CmdResult(127, "", "curl: not found"))
|
||||
http_client = pg.HttpClient(self.cfg, sysm)
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(pg.ApiError) as cm:
|
||||
http_client.get_pinned_curl("h", "1.2.3.4", 1337, "/addKey", "t", "p")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(cm.exception.kind, "network")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_unclassified_exit_code_falls_back_to_network_with_stderr(self):
|
||||
sysm = FakeCurlSystem(pg.CmdResult(7, "", "curl: (7) Couldn't connect to server"))
|
||||
http_client = pg.HttpClient(self.cfg, sysm)
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(pg.ApiError) as cm:
|
||||
http_client.get_pinned_curl("h", "1.2.3.4", 1337, "/addKey", "t", "p")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(cm.exception.kind, "network")
|
||||
self.assertIn("Couldn't connect", cm.exception.detail)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestHttpHelpers(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_key_and_ip_validators(self):
|
||||
self.assertTrue(pg.valid_wg_key(PUB_A))
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user