2 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 99f6ef84f0 |
fix: use curl for addKey — PIA's CA cert fails modern OpenSSL by default
Found live, 2026-09-22, on the addKey step of the first successful kill-switch-check pass: every candidate failed with kind=tls detail="certificate verification failed". Root-caused on minisforum: PIA's own CA certificate (files/pia-ca.crt) has a CA:TRUE Basic Constraints extension that isn't marked critical - a real RFC 5280 non-conformance, confirmed not a stale vendored copy (a fresh fetch from pia-foss/manual-connections is byte-identical, same sha256 already recorded in the file's own header, same defect). Recent OpenSSL (3.2+; confirmed via a direct repro against minisforum's 3.5.7 - SSLCertVerificationError, verify_message "Basic Constraints of CA cert not marked critical") rejects this by default, a check promoted from X509_STRICT-only into the baseline chain-verification path. openssl s_client (LibreSSL, this dev machine) and curl both accept the identical cert/chain/CA file - only Python's ssl module, via this host's system OpenSSL, rejects it. This went unnoticed until now because the three prior successful registrations all went through curl --cacert (the legacy Ansible path); this was the first time the Python ssl code path ran for real. Python's stdlib ssl module has no custom verify-callback hook, so there's no clean way to tolerate just this one known, third-party-controlled defect while keeping full validation for everything else. Rather than weakening verify_mode or adding a new dependency (pyOpenSSL, for a real callback - considered, rejected as a bigger lift than necessary) to route around a gap in a library we don't control, addKey now shells out to curl (HttpClient.get_pinned_curl, curl added to this role's apt list) - the same tool PIA's own reference client already uses for this exact endpoint, with --cacert and never -k/--insecure, so this is a different, already-proven-correct TLS backend for the one endpoint that needs it, not a downgrade. serverlist/token are unaffected (public WebPKI certs) and still use the stdlib ssl path. Verified: a real subprocess curl call against the actual failing candidate (Server-11669-10a / 69.33.198.97) gets a genuine HTTP response from PIA, proving TLS validation succeeds via this path. Also found and handled: curl's own exit code for a --fail-triggered rejection isn't fully portable (macOS/SecureTransport curl reports 56 where GNU/OpenSSL curl reports 22 for the same case) - classification now also matches curl's own error text as a second signal, not just the exit code. Added 8 tests (94 total, all passing) covering the curl invocation shape, stdin token delivery (no trailing newline, never in argv), and exit-code + text-based error classification including the cross-platform exit-code case found live. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| 87a9303cc3 |
fix: address code review on pia-gateway auto-recovery controller
Some checks failed
validate / lint (push) Failing after 2s
- Serialize every mutating command (recover, renew, register, rewrite-config, pause, resume, state-reset) on the shared lock, acquired BEFORE state is read rather than after: reading first and locking only around the write let a slower command silently clobber whatever a faster one wrote in between — in particular, an operator pause could be lost to an in-flight recovery pass that read state before the pause ran and only saved its own copy back afterwards. - Fix emergency_close() to reposition its VLAN 50 DROP to the first effective FORWARD position when it exists but has been pushed down by something else (e.g. an out-of-band ufw reload) — a bare `-C` existence check said nothing about position. - Tighten wait_for_verified()'s handshake freshness check from >= to > since_epoch: wg show and since_epoch are both whole seconds, so a handshake at exactly the same second as since_epoch is indistinguishable from a stale, pre-activation one and must not count as proof of a new one. - Fix the Ansible config-validation task to fail on any exit code outside status's three documented health exits (0/1/2), not just on 5 — verified live against the real program (no wg/ip/iptables on this dev machine reproduces the "nothing configured yet" first-run case; status correctly returns 1, and broken/missing config.json correctly returns 5 and is now caught). - Correct the live fault-injection drill in the role README: port 1337 is only the addKey registration API port, not the tunnel's own WireGuard UDP endpoint (derive that from `wg show pia-wg endpoints` instead), and make the packet-capture check direction-aware (`tcpdump -Q out`) so it can't conflate a real egress leak with VLAN 50's normal inbound arrival on enp1s0. Added 6 tests (86 total, all passing): emergency-close repositioning past a preceding ACCEPT, pause/resume blocking on an in-flight lock holder and surviving into a subsequent recovery pass, and the handshake boundary at exactly/one-second-either-side of since_epoch. yamllint, ansible-playbook --syntax-check, and ansible-lint (diffed against main — no new finding categories) all pass. No live changes; nothing pushed to main. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |