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- Serialize every mutating command (recover, renew, register, rewrite-config, pause, resume, state-reset) on the shared lock, acquired BEFORE state is read rather than after: reading first and locking only around the write let a slower command silently clobber whatever a faster one wrote in between — in particular, an operator pause could be lost to an in-flight recovery pass that read state before the pause ran and only saved its own copy back afterwards. - Fix emergency_close() to reposition its VLAN 50 DROP to the first effective FORWARD position when it exists but has been pushed down by something else (e.g. an out-of-band ufw reload) — a bare `-C` existence check said nothing about position. - Tighten wait_for_verified()'s handshake freshness check from >= to > since_epoch: wg show and since_epoch are both whole seconds, so a handshake at exactly the same second as since_epoch is indistinguishable from a stale, pre-activation one and must not count as proof of a new one. - Fix the Ansible config-validation task to fail on any exit code outside status's three documented health exits (0/1/2), not just on 5 — verified live against the real program (no wg/ip/iptables on this dev machine reproduces the "nothing configured yet" first-run case; status correctly returns 1, and broken/missing config.json correctly returns 5 and is now caught). - Correct the live fault-injection drill in the role README: port 1337 is only the addKey registration API port, not the tunnel's own WireGuard UDP endpoint (derive that from `wg show pia-wg endpoints` instead), and make the packet-capture check direction-aware (`tcpdump -Q out`) so it can't conflate a real egress leak with VLAN 50's normal inbound arrival on enp1s0. Added 6 tests (86 total, all passing): emergency-close repositioning past a preceding ACCEPT, pause/resume blocking on an in-flight lock holder and surviving into a subsequent recovery pass, and the handshake boundary at exactly/one-second-either-side of since_epoch. yamllint, ansible-playbook --syntax-check, and ansible-lint (diffed against main — no new finding categories) all pass. No live changes; nothing pushed to main. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
65 lines
3.0 KiB
YAML
65 lines
3.0 KiB
YAML
---
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# Part of role: pia-gateway
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# Included by: tasks/main.yaml when pia_registration_backend == "shared"
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# Description: Registers with PIA through the on-host controller
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# (`pia-gateway register`), i.e. the same token/addKey/stage/activate/
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# verify transaction the unattended recovery and renewal timers use.
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# Runs when there is no config yet, no VERIFIED registration baseline in
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# the controller's state, or an explicit force flag. Reports success only
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# after a fresh WireGuard handshake was observed on the activated config
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# — never on `addKey` HTTP status alone.
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#
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# Requires the kill switch to be active (tasks/routing.yaml runs first in
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# main.yaml); the program refuses to activate otherwise (exit 3) and the
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# play fails loudly rather than opening anything.
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- name: Check whether a PIA WireGuard config already exists
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ansible.builtin.stat:
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path: "{{ pia_wg_config_dir }}/{{ pia_wg_interface }}.conf"
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register: pia_wg_conf_stat
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- name: Check whether the controller has a verified registration baseline
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ansible.builtin.stat:
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path: "{{ pia_gateway_state_dir }}/state.json"
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register: pia_state_stat
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- name: Read the controller state (no secrets are stored in it)
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ansible.builtin.slurp:
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src: "{{ pia_gateway_state_dir }}/state.json"
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register: pia_state_raw
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when: pia_state_stat.stat.exists
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- name: Decide whether registration is needed this run
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ansible.builtin.set_fact:
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pia_has_baseline: >-
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{{ pia_state_stat.stat.exists
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and ((pia_state_raw.content | b64decode | from_json).last_verified_registration is not none) }}
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pia_registration_mode: "{{ 'new-key' if (pia_force_key_rotation | bool) else 'same-key' }}"
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pia_region_args: "{{ ['--region', pia_region] if (pia_region is not none and (pia_region | string | trim | length) > 0) else [] }}"
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- name: Run the shared PIA registration transaction
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ansible.builtin.command:
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argv: "{{ [pia_gateway_program, 'register', '--via', 'ansible', '--mode', pia_registration_mode] + pia_region_args }}"
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register: pia_register_result
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changed_when: true
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failed_when: pia_register_result.rc != 0
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when: >-
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(pia_force_reregister | bool)
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or (pia_force_key_rotation | bool)
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or not pia_wg_conf_stat.stat.exists
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or not (pia_has_baseline | bool)
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# argv form: no shell, no secrets in arguments (credentials are read from
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# the root-only file by the program itself), so this task is deliberately
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# NOT no_log — its stdout is the secret-free JSON summary and the
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# per-candidate diagnostics, which are exactly what an operator needs
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# when a run fails. The lock is taken inside the program (waits up to
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# pia_recovery_lock_wait_sec for an in-flight timer run to finish).
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- name: Record that registration happened this run
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ansible.builtin.set_fact:
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pia_registered_this_run: "{{ pia_register_result is not skipped }}"
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- name: Show the registration summary
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ansible.builtin.debug:
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msg: "{{ pia_register_result.stdout_lines | default(['skipped — config and verified baseline already present']) }}"
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